The general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets (GEI) is extended by adding fiat money, fiscal and monetary policy and a cashin-advance constraint. The central bank either pegs the interest rate or money supply while the fiscal authority sets a Ricardian or a nonRicardian fiscal plan. We prove the existence of equilibria and characterize indeterminacy in all four scenarios. In Ricardian economies, the conditions required for existence are not more restrictive than in standard GEI. In non-Ricardian economies, the sufficient conditions for existence are more demanding. In the Ricardian economy, neither the price level * We are grateful to John Geanakoplos, Martin Hellwig and Herakles Polemarchakis for helpful discussions and suggestions. We also benefited from comments of the seminar participants at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods and 1st Annual CARESSCowles Conference on General Equilibrium Theory and its Applications. The usual disclaimer applies.
Introduction
In this paper we extend the standard general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets by introducing fiat money and adding a public authority. The 1 The idea that a non-Ricardian policy might lead to a determinate equilibrium first ap-We study four important combinations of fiscal and monetary policies by combining nominal interest rate peg and money supply policy of the central bank with a Ricardian and a non-Ricardian fiscal policy. For all these cases, we prove existence of an equilibrium and characterize its determinacy properties.
If the fiscal authority follows a Ricardian policy, there exist monetary competitive equilibria under assumptions which are close to the standard assumptions in GEI with financial assets. As in the standard GEI model without a central bank and a fiscal authority, the equilibrium in this Ricardian framework is not determinate. More precisely, there exists a monetary equilibrium under a Ricardian fiscal rule for every fixed positive price level and for every fixed equivalent martingale measure. This result is true for both interest rate peg and money supply policy. We argue that the indeterminacy of the price level in this Ricardian economy is purely nominal. However, the indeterminacy of the martingale measure can be expected to be real since markets are incomplete.
If the fiscal authority follows a non-Ricardian policy, existence of equilibrium requires more restrictive assumptions as compared to the Ricardian case.
Loosely speaking, the existence of equilibrium requires either high enough gains to trade or positive tax returns. The intuition is that if the fiscal authority fixes nominal transfers at some predetermined and positive level, it must earn seignorage or tax returns to be able to balance its budget. If taxes are zero, then the gains to trade in the economy must be large enough to induce some positive seigniorage income for the government. We use the measure for the gains to trade introduced by Geanakoplos (1992, 2003a ) to prove existence for both interest rate peg and money supply policy even if taxes are zero.
Importantly, every obvious degree of indeterminacy we found in the Ricardian economy is lost under the assumption that the government only trades riskpeared in Dubey and Geanakoplos (1992) . They formally prove the generic local uniqueness under a particular non-Ricardian fiscal policy. plies that the indeterminacy found in this paper can be expected to have real effects on the allocation. Second, we provide an alternative proof for existence in the non-Ricardian framework, which is first given in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003(b) ). The proof in the latter paper uses a strategic market game approach, while our proof adapts more traditional techniques in general equilibrium analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the monetary economy including the government and define the general equilibrium. In Section 3, we present our main results for a Ricardian economy, including both interest rate peg and money supply policy. In Section 4, we provide a parallel result for a non-Ricardian economy. In Section 5 we conclude the paper and
give the proofs of all results in the Appendix.
2 After completing the first draft of this paper, we learned that Gourdel and Triki (2005) independently studied a similar economy under interest rate peg. They obtain results similar to our Theorems 1 and 3. We will comment on this in Sections 3.3 and 4.3.
2 The model
The economy
We study an exchange economy which extends over two dates, the present time t = 0 and the future t = 1. The present is known with certainty, but at date 1 there are S possible states of nature which we index with s ∈ S = {1, . . . , S}. Including the present, there are S + 1 states of nature lying in the set S * := {0, 1, ..., S}. We add an accounting period at the end of each state s ∈ S at t = 1. At every s ∈ S * there are L consumption goods indexed with l = 1, . . . , L traded at spot prices p sl . We denote a consumption plan with
. All commodities are perishable.
At t = 0, there are asset markets for J ≤ S financial contracts indexed with j = 1, . . . , J. Each asset is a promise to deliver V j s ∈ R + units of money in every state s ∈ S and is traded at price q j in period zero. There is no default on such promises. The first asset is assumed to be a riskless government bond. Denote the S × J-matrix of returns with V , the S × (J − 1)-matrix of the returns of the risky assets with A, the 1 × J-vector of asset prices with q V and the 1 × (J − 1) -vector of asset prices excluding the price of the bond with q . In addition, there is fiat money, a government liability which can also be held as a store of value between the periods.
The state price of state s is as usual the present value at date 0 of one unit of income in state s. We denote these strictly positive state prices with
++ , where a 0 := 1. The 1 × S-vector of state prices (a 1 , ..., a S ) isâ. It is well known that the absence of arbitrage is equivalent to asset prices satisfying q V =âV . We define µ s := a s (1 + r 0 ) > 0 for every s ∈ S. Since s∈S µ s = 1, µ defines a probability measure at t = 0. Following the terminology in the finance literature, µ is called the equivalent martingale measure at t = 0.
The households
The economy is populated by a finite set I := {1, ..., I} of households. At t = 0, the asset markets open first. On this market, the household trades money n i 0 ∈ R + , riskfree government bonds b i 0 ∈ R and a portfolio of risky assets θ i ∈ R J−1 . In addition, household i receives a (lump-sum) transfer δ i H 0 from the government, where H 0 ∈ R + is the aggregate transfer from which every household i gets a share δ i ∈ R ++ . Therefore, household i faces the constraint
where 1 1+r0 is the price of the nominal bond. In the goods markets, which open next, household i is subject to the following cash-in-advance constraint:
The money at the end of t = 0, m i 0 , is
Combining (1) and (3), we get
Equation (4) is the familiar flow budget constraint, which says that the total expenditure within one period cannot exceed the total wealth.
From (2) and (3), we get an equivalent formulation of the cash-in-advance constraint as
We will use this formulation for the transactions technology because it turns out to be more convenient.
The wealth tax of person i on endowments in
, is paid at the end of period zero or equivalently at the beginning of period one.
In t = 1, in every state the asset markets open again to allow agents to borrow against their income which they receive at the end of this period. However, there is no uncertainty involved anymore, i.e. each state s ∈ S has only one successor state which we call the end of period t = 1 and which serves for accounting purposes only. We assume that a riskfree bond can be traded at each s ∈ S.
Denoting the quantity of bonds with b i s and the transfer in state s ∈ S with δ i H s , the flow budget constraint reads
and the cash-in-advance constraint is
At the end of t = 1, the only economic activity is the payment of the debt and of the income tax in state s ∈ S, p s · τ i s . Therefore, the terminal condition is
Denote with e i the vector (e i s ) s∈S * and with τ i the vector (τ i s ) s∈S * . The budget set of every household i is the set
For the later analysis, it is convenient to derive an intertemporal version of the budget constraint by using the no-arbitrage conditions. First, combine (8) and (6) 
Multiply each such equation with its respective state price 4 To save the notation, we suppress the parameters in the notation. The budget set should always be understood as B i (p, q, r, H) := B i p, q, r, H; e i , τ i , δ i .
and add these equations up together with (4) . Use the no-arbitrage condition
where m n := (m s · n s ) s∈S * . The left hand side is the expenditure in terms of its date−0 value, while the right hand side is the discounted nominal wealth. 
Every household i ∈ I gets utility from consuming in every node s ∈ S * according to a function 
The government
At each state s ∈ S * , the government taxes the household and distributes transfers. We denote the total commodity tax by τ :
, where 5 The S × 1-vector with 1 in every coordinate is 1. 6 A vector x ∈ R n satisfies x > 0 if and only if x i ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n, and if there is a j such that x j > 0. Accordingly, x 0 if and only if x i > 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n and x ≥ 0 if and only if This assumption can be justified by an appeal to realism. It has important consequences for the determinacy of equilibria. We will comment on this in Section 4.3. Combining all these elements, the sequential government budget
in period zero and
in period one. Similar to the household, we have a terminal condition at the end of every node in period one:
For later analysis, we will study an equivalent formulation of the sequential constraint (11) − (13). Plug (13) as a function of B s and (11) as a function of
The equation (14) is the intertemporal budget equation for each branch of the event tree. It is not difficult to see that the equation (14) is equivalent to the sequential budget constraint (11) − (13).
Multiply each equation (14) with its state price and add these equations over the states to get the government's intertemporal budget constraint at t = 0 for the entire event tree as
Competitive equilibria
The market clearing condition is specified in the usual way as
where the equation (16), (17) , (18) , and (19 ) are commodity, money and asset market clearing conditions, respectively. We write the bond and risky asset separately since we want to emphasize the difference of the market supply in two cases.
The primitives of the economy can be summarized by the vector
Definition 1 An Equilibrium for the economy E is a tuple
(2) The actions of the monetary-fiscal authority M , B, H satisfy (11)- (13) .
(3) in every state, markets clear, i.e. (16)- (19) hold.
An equilibrium is said to be monetary if p sl < +∞ for ∀ s ∈ S * , l ∈ L.
In the proof of the theorems given in the following sections, we indeed use another equivalent equilibrium concept. For household 1 define the complete markets budget set (7), (9) hold. ,
where we use µ because a is a function of µ and r. From the no-arbitrage conditions, the budget sets of agents i ≥ 2 can also be expressed as depending on µ instead of q. Following Cass (1984) and Duffie and Shafer (1985) , in Definition 2 we define a concept of effective monetary equilibrium.
Definition 2 An effective equilibrium for the economy E is a tuple
(2) The actions of the monetary-fiscal authority M , B, H satisfy (11)- (13).
(3) In every state, commodity and money markets clear, i.e. (16)- (17) hold.
An effective equilibrium is said to be monetary if
From Definitions 1 and 2, we can immediately see two differences. First, in the effective equilibrium, household 1 is only restricted by the intertemporal budget constraint and the cash-in-advance constraint. Second, household 1 does
Instead he takes the residual asset to clear the asset market. Therefore, the asset market clears by construction.
It is immediate that every effective equilibrium is an equilibrium as defined in Definition 1. Indeed, it is easy to see that the no-arbitrage conditions determine q given µ and r. To show that a tuple (p, µ, r) ,
as defined in the effective monetary equilibrium corresponds to a monetary equilibrium, we first need to check that the household 1 satisfies the budget equations (4)- (8) and second that his choice is still optimal in the sequential constraint. The first property follows directly from Walras law. 7 To see that household one still maximizes his utility, just notice that the sequential constraint is a subset of the intertemporal one. Hence, the old consumption vector must be optimal since it is still feasible under the sequential constraint and it was already optimal in the larger intertemporal constraint. These arguments are standard and not made explicit here.
Fiscal policy
In general, fiscal policy consists of a plan for taxes, transfers and bond market actions. However, in this paper we keep the taxes fixed and restrict attention to different transfer policies in combination with bond market actions. Subject to this restriction we will study four different combinations of fiscal and monetary policy of the government: the central bank might peg the interest rate or money supply, while the fiscal authority might run a Ricardian or a non-Ricardian kind of transfer policy.
We restrict attention to the following structure. In the Ricardian transfer policy we will consider here, the fiscal authority redistributes the seigniorage income and the tax returns at each state of the economy. The government bonds adjust accordingly to satisfy the sequential constraint of the government. 7 We leave it an exercise to the reader to check these equations.
Bloise and Polemarchakis (2006) call such a policy a balanced transfer rule. We adopt their terminology and consequently define a balanced transfer fiscal policy as follows:
The balanced transfer fiscal policy determines the vector (H, B)
by the functions H (p, M, r) and B (p, M ), where
Under Assumption 5, one can check that equations (11)- (13) always hold.
Therefore, the fiscal policy is Ricardian.
A Fiscal policy which fixes transfers in every state of the world exogenously will be called fixed transfer fiscal policy. Formally,
Assumption 6
The fixed transfer fiscal policy determines the vector (H, B) by the functions H (p, M, r) and B (p, M, r), where
Using this rule, one can check that (11)- (12) hold, but the terminal condition (13) does not hold for some price and interest rate vector. Equivalently, (14) need not be true for some vector of prices and interest rates. In the following theorem, we show that for every fixed price level and for every fixed martingale measure, there exists a monetary equilibrium which implements the interest rate target of the central bank. 
Money supply control
Under money supply control, the central bank fixes the money supply process
If this is the case, we impose 
Interpretation and literature
We provide some intuition for the existence and the indeterminacy results in Theorems 1 and 2. To prove existence of an equilibrium we use similar assumptions as in the GEI-model with nominal assets. The balanced transfer rule always implies that the government balances its budget, so there are no additional assumptions necessary to achieve this. In addition, our equilibrium could be a no-trade equilibrium in which there is no seigniorage income for the central bank. In this case, the government just redistributes potential tax returns among the households according to their shares (δ i ) i∈I .
The intuition concerning indeterminacy can be given by counting equations and variables. The macro variables to be determined in the effective equilibrium are the L(S + 1) commodity spot prices, the S − 1 dimensional equivalent martingale measure and the S + 1 interest rates. In the interest rate peg case, all interest rates are exogenously fixed. There are L(S + 1) equilibrium restrictions coming from commodity market clearing. Finally, there is a single Walras law at work since household one only faces the intertemporal budget constraint.
In total, there are S more variables than independent equations, so S is the number of total indeterminacy in this economy.
Among these S dimensions of indeterminacy there is one degree of homogeneity involved which allows us to fix the price level. Indeed, if agents react to a doubling of the commodity prices by doubling their portfolios and money demand, the transfers will also double by the balanced transfer rule and hence the allocation is unaffected. It can be expected that the remaining S − 1 degrees of indeterminacy inherent in the measure are real. An argument which supports this conjecture is given in Nakajima and Polemarchakis (2001).
In the case of money supply control, we have S + 1 more endogenous interest rates which have to be determined. However, there are S + 1 additional equilibrium restrictions coming from money market clearing. So the intuition is exactly as in the case of interest rate peg.
The recent literature in Ricardian economies can be summarized as follows. 
Monetary equilibria with fixed transfers
In the fixed transfer case it is obvious from (15) Define the functionζ s :
otherwise.
A feasible allocation (x −s , e s ) := (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x S ) |xs=es is said to be γ-Pareto optimal in state s ∈ S at e s if there does not exist a trade vector ζ s ∈ R IL in state s such that i ζ S ) with at least one i ∈ I where the strict inequality holds. If (x −s , e s ) is γ-Pareto optimal in state s ∈ S at e s , then we equivalently say that there are no gains to γ-diminished trade in s ∈ S at (x −s , e s ). Accordingly, the gains to trade at (x −s , e s ) are defined by γ s (x −s , e s ) := min{γ|there are no gains to γ-diminished trade in s ∈ S}.
Interest rate peg
In the fixed transfer case, we assume that the interest rates are strictly positive. Assumption 10 For every s ∈ S, either τ s > 0, or γ s (x −s , e s ) > r s for all
The following theorem states that every interest rate target of the central bank can be embedded in an equilibrium with fixed transfers. Note that we do not claim any indeterminacy result here. 
Money supply control
The definition of equilibrium is straightforward: For the same reason as in the interest rate peg, we also need to impose a Gains-to-Trade hypothesis for money supply policy.
Assumption 11
For every s ∈ S, either τ s > 0, or, for every feasible (x −s , e s ), 
Interpretation and literature
We will now give an interpretation of Theorems 3 and 4. The economy with fixed transfers studied in Section 4 has only one important difference compared to the economy with balanced transfers in Section 3. In the balanced transfer case, the transfers always adjust to make the government budget hold. Therefore, (14) is an identity which does not impose restrictions on the equilibrium set. In the fixed transfer case, (14) imposes S additional restrictions on the set of equilibria.
So all the S degrees of total indeterminacy we obtained in the balanced transfer case are lost here.
This conclusion follows from the assumption that the government only trades riskfree bonds and the fact that the transfers are fixed. Intuitively, the fixed transfers always impose some restrictions, only the number of restrictions depends on the set of assets the government trades. Our assumption that it only trades riskfree assets implies that it enters period one with state independent debt. To allow for budget balance, taxes and seigniorage must also be independent of the state. Since there are S states, this provides the intuition why there are S additional restrictions. We study a similar economy as Geanakoplos (2003b, 2006 ), but to prove existence we basically follow the ideas in Bloise, Dréze and Polemarchakis (2005) by introducing a price determination mechanism in the fixed point mapping for every price object. This allows us to establish a unified framework to prove existence of equilibrium in all four cases we consider. In addition, by embedding each equilibrium object into the fixed point mapping, we provide a clear intuition for the mechanism which determines the equilibrium.
Gourdel and Triki (2005) provide a result similar to our Theorem 3 under interest rate peg policy. In addition to the differences mentioned in Section 3.3, there is one more major distinction in this case. While Gourdel and Triki (2005) need strictly positive taxes to establish the existence of a monetary equilibrium, our result also allows for the possibility of zero taxes provided that the economy has sufficiently high gains to trade.
Concluding remarks
To conclude the paper, we discuss some directions of future research. First, a different timing of transactions can be considered. One possibility is to use the cash-in-advance constraint as introduced by Svensson (1985) , where the commodity markets open before the asset markets. This could be a suitable framework to study both the transaction and precautionary demand for money.
However, different from our two-period model, the new timing needs an infinite horizon to support money's value. Second, it would be interesting to introduce a Baumol-Tobin structure in which households voluntarily hold money as a store of value even though other interest bearing bonds coexist. Both existence and determinacy in the Baumol-Tobin economy are open and difficult questions.
Doing so probably requires more than two periods to enrich the potential transaction patterns. In particular, an infinite horizon model would be of interest.
Finally, the model presented here delivers a unified framework for monetary and fiscal policy within a GEI-economy. Therefore, it would be of interest to study the general equilibrium effects of changing monetary policy parameters. Under incomplete financial market the effect can be expected to be real, an important feature for policy analysis. Such an analysis would contribute to the old but fundamental debate about the neutrality of money.
Appendix
In this appendix we give the proof for the theorems in the main text. The proofs are organized as follows. First, we define an abstract economy. Second, we show the properties of the household and aggregate demand. Then we prove the results under different monetary-fiscal policy combinations.
An abstract economy
Define the inverse price level as c := 
Multiply (6) by cµ to get 
and the terminal condition is
We can now redefine household i's budget set by . By redefining variables, the intertemporal budget constraint (9) becomes
The household 1's budget constraint is (23) and (25) hold .
With the obvious definitions, equation (14) becomes
and (15) becomes
A monetary equilibrium in this abstract economy is a vector (π, µ, r, c) , In the following proofs, we will therefore concentrate on equilibria in the abstract economy.
The household and market demand
µ is an element of the S-dimensional unit simplex, which we denote with ∆ S−1 .
The extended positive real line is as usual R + := R + ∪ {+∞}. We start by deriving the properties of the budget sets in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 2 and 3, the budget sets satisfy the following properties:
(1.1) For i ≥ 2, B i π, µ, r, H is a non-empty and upper hemi-continuous cor-
(1.5) For i ≥ 2, as long as r 0 < +∞, B i π, µ, r, H is lower hemi-continuous
(1.6) B 1 π, r, H is non-empty and upper hemi-continuous for π, r, H ∈ ∆×
(1.7) B 1 π, r, H is compact for π, r, H ∈ interior(∆) × R for every s ∈ S to see that this is true. (1.10) Since H 1 > 0 and r 0 < +∞, the same argument as in (1.8) applies.
The demand correspondence for every consumer type i ≥ 2 is defined to be − , ∀s ∈ S * , ∀i ∈ I. This implies (2.6).
Concerning (2.7), we first argue for i ≥ 2. For r 0 → +∞ we argue that the sequence of best responses converges to a (
2), the demand set is upper hemi-continuous along this sequence. We will argue that if m i 0 > 0 in the limit, then the household can increase his utility. Since the cash-in-advance constraint binds in the case of positive interest rates, 
This equation reveals that household one earns zero from selling his endowments in t = 0. Maximization thus implies selling no endowments. From the cash-inadvance it follows that money demand is zero. Part (2.8) follows from the same logic as part (2.7).
Define the market demand correspondence of the commodity and money as (3.1) Z π, µ, r, H is non-empty, compact and convex-valued for π, µ, r, H ∈ Proof: Lemma (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4) follow directly from individual demand (Lemma 2). Lemma (3.3) follows from adding up (25) over i ∈ I and using (27).
Proof of Theorem 1
We fix the martingale measure µ 0 and the inverse price level c > 0 at the outset. The transfers are determined endogenously according to the balanced transfer rule.
Preliminary definitions
From Assumption 5, we can define a government transfer function H π, r, M :=
We slightly abuse the notation by denoting both the function and the image with 
Construction of a fixed point mapping
To make the proof compatible with a zero interest rate, we start by defining the modified interest rate process r n := (r For n > (S + 1)L define
It is easy to see that . 10 Define a compact and convex set K H such that
From Lemma 3 we infer that f n (π, M , H, z) is a non-empty, compact, convexvalued and upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem establishes the existence of a fixed point π * n , M * n , H * n , z * n .
The limit of the fixed points is an equilibrium
Since π * n , M * n , H * n , z * n is bounded for each n, there exists a convergent we know that z *
It is straightforward to see that the vector π * , M * , H * , z * corresponds to an equilibrium in the abstract economy under interest rate peg with balanced transfers.
Proof of Theorem 2
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we fix an arbitrary inverse price level c > 0
and an arbitrary martingale measure µ 0.
Preliminary definitions
In the abstract economy, the money supply vector is M = c· M 0 , µ s M s s∈S 0. Define the transfers H π, r, M to individuals as in Section 6.3.1. Since M is fixed here, we write H (π, r).
Construction of a fixed point mapping
As before, we define ∆ n := π ∈ ∆|π sl ≥ where f n π π, r, H, z := arg max
Again, all these mappings satisfy the assumptions required to apply Kakutani's Theorem, implying the existence of a fixed point π * n , r * n , H * n , z * n .
The limit of the fixed points is an equilibrium
Since π * n , r * n , H * n , z * n is bounded for each n, there exists a convergent sub- Claim 1: In period zero, the money market clears and r * 0 < +∞. To see this, we argue in three steps.
Step 1 : We prove that z * Step 3 : We prove r * 0 < +∞. Suppose that r * 0 = +∞. From the first step, we know that z * m0 = 0; from the second step, we know z * m0 = M 0 . These two facts imply M 0 = 0, a contradiction.
Claim 2: For every s ∈ S, the money market in state s clears and r * s < +∞. To see this, we argue in several steps.
Step 1 : We show that z * Step 3 : We show that π * 0. In fact, we saw in the previous step that Lemma (2.5) can be applied. So if there is a s ∈ S * and a l ∈ L such that π * sl = 0, then Lemma (2.5) implies a contradiction to Step 1.
Step 4 Finally, π * , r * , H * , z * corresponds to an equilibrium in the abstract economy with money supply control and balanced transfers.
Proof of Theorem 3
With fixed nominal transfers we just introduce a transfer mapping which transforms the original transfers into discounted real transfers. In addition, we now determine c and µ endogenously in the fixed point.
Preliminary definitions
Define an augmented taxation
where n ∈ N and n > min 
For fixed r, we just write µ 
Construction of a fixed point mapping
Denote aggregate demand with Z n π, µ, H := Z π, r, µ, H, τ n . Lemma (3.4) allows us to define the compact and convex set K m such that
for all π ∈ ∆, µ ∈ ∆ S−1 and H ∈ R could be infinite. Clearly, τ n → τ . By continuity, Given the construction of c n (π, M , H), Lemma (3.3) applies for every n. It is easy to see that the government budget is also balanced in the limit. It follows as before that the limit of the fixed point vectors correspond to an equilibrium in the abstract economy with interest rate peg and fixed transfers.
Proof of Theorem 4
This proof is a combination of the proofs of Theorems 2 and 3. Given this, it is easy to see that the commodity markets clear. From Lemma (2.4) we get π * 0. Hence we have z * ∈ Z π * , r * , µ * , H * .
From the construction of c n (π, r, µ, z m ), we know that c * < +∞. Next, we
show that c * > 0 and µ * 0.
For µ * 0, the argument is quite similar to the one given in the Theorem 3.
For every s ∈ S, if τ s > 0 , it is obvious that µ * s > 0. Suppose τ s = 0 for some s ∈ S and µ * s = 0. From the fact c * < +∞, we know that lim n→∞ c * n µ * n s = 0. From the inequality lim n→∞ Therefore, we must have µ * s > 0 for all s ∈ S. The result of c * > 0 can be proved in a similar way as in Theorem 3.
Given µ * 0 and c * > 0 we can now infer from equations (30) -(33) that the money markets clear.
It follows that the limit of the fixed point vectors corresponds to an equilibrium in the abstract economy with money supply control and fixed transfers.
